Introduction
The relationship between Bangladesh and India is one of the most complex and multi-faceted bilateral engagements in South Asia. These two neighboring countries share a 4,096 km-long border, the fifth-longest land boundary in the world. Despite historic, cultural, and economic ties, the two nations have frequently found themselves at odds over several key issues, including border management, water sharing, trade imbalances, and migration. While many of these tensions are longstanding, the core conflict between Bangladesh and India revolves around the management and sharing of transboundary rivers, which has grown into a symbol of deeper political distrust between the two nations.
This essay explores the central conflict between Bangladesh and India—water sharing—along with the underlying political and economic factors that intensify this conflict. It highlights how this dispute reflects broader concerns about regional hegemony, economic inequality, and environmental sustainability.
Historical Roots of the Bangladesh-India Relationship
Bangladesh and India’s relationship officially began in 1971 when India supported Bangladesh's war of independence from Pakistan. India’s military intervention was instrumental in ensuring Bangladesh’s victory and independence. However, even in the early days, frictions began to emerge over border management and water rights. As the years progressed, unresolved territorial disputes, migration flows, and trade inequalities added layers of tension to the relationship.
While diplomatic niceties are maintained through various agreements and dialogues, the unresolved conflicts—particularly around water management—continue to shape the relationship between the two nations.
The Central Conflict: Transboundary Rivers and Water Sharing
The heart of Bangladesh-India tensions lies in the shared river systems, particularly the Ganges, Teesta, and Brahmaputra rivers. With 54 transboundary rivers flowing between the two countries, effective water management is crucial for both nations. However, conflicting national interests, combined with the absence of robust and enforceable treaties, have led to persistent disputes.
1. The Teesta River Dispute
The Teesta River flows from the Indian state of Sikkim through West Bengal into northern Bangladesh. It is a vital water source for agriculture in Bangladesh, especially in the country’s northern districts. However, India has built numerous barrages and dams upstream, drastically reducing water flow into Bangladesh, particularly during the dry season.
Negotiations over the Teesta River began in the 1950s, and the two nations came close to an agreement in 2011. However, opposition from the state government of West Bengal, led by Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, stalled the process. Despite numerous diplomatic attempts, no formal agreement has been reached. This protracted dispute reflects Bangladesh's fear of water insecurity and India's reluctance to override regional political pressures.
2. The Farakka Barrage and Ganges Water Sharing
One of the earliest and most controversial water-related projects between India and Bangladesh was the construction of the Farakka Barrage in the 1960s. Located just upstream of the Bangladesh border, the barrage was designed to divert water into the Hooghly River to prevent siltation of the Kolkata port.
For Bangladesh, the diversion drastically reduced downstream water flow, especially during the dry season, causing severe impacts on agriculture, fisheries, and biodiversity. The 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty attempted to address some of these concerns, but Bangladesh continues to feel that India holds the upper hand in water management, leaving Bangladesh vulnerable to Indian decisions.
Political Power Imbalance: Hegemony and Unequal Bargaining Power
The water-sharing dispute is a symptom of a broader power asymmetry between India and Bangladesh. India, being the regional giant with economic and military dominance, often negotiates from a position of strength. This imbalance creates a sense of mistrust and resentment in Bangladesh, where India’s actions are often perceived as unilateral and dismissive of Bangladesh’s interests.
Bangladesh’s leadership often finds itself in a difficult balancing act—seeking closer ties with India for economic and strategic benefits while appeasing domestic nationalist sentiments that view India with suspicion. This internal political dynamic further complicates efforts to resolve bilateral issues like water sharing.
Environmental and Climate Change Factors
Climate change adds a further layer of urgency to the water-sharing conflict. Both Bangladesh and India are highly vulnerable to climate-induced water variability, including erratic monsoons, glacial melt, and rising sea levels. For Bangladesh, climate-induced water stress poses an existential threat, particularly for the millions living in low-lying delta regions.
India’s upstream control of major rivers means that Bangladesh’s water security depends heavily on Indian cooperation. As climate change amplifies the unpredictability of river flows, the absence of clear and enforceable water-sharing agreements becomes an increasingly severe threat to Bangladesh’s food security, public health, and economic stability.
Migration and Border Tensions: A Related Conflict
Although water sharing is the central point of contention, it interacts with other bilateral tensions, particularly migration and border security. Water scarcity in Bangladesh often drives rural populations to migrate to India, contributing to tensions in Indian border states. The perceived influx of illegal Bangladeshi migrants has become a politically charged issue in India, fueling nationalist rhetoric and straining relations further.
This migratory pressure, often exacerbated by environmental degradation linked to upstream water management, creates a feedback loop where water disputes fuel migration, and migration tensions feed into broader mistrust between the two countries.
Economic Inequality and Trade Imbalances
Economic factors also shape the water conflict. India is Bangladesh’s largest trading partner, but the trade relationship is heavily imbalanced in India’s favor. Bangladesh’s large trade deficit with India exacerbates perceptions of economic dependency and vulnerability. This economic asymmetry reinforces fears that India will use water-sharing agreements as leverage in other economic and political negotiations.
Bangladesh’s heavy reliance on agriculture, which employs nearly 40% of its workforce, means that water scarcity directly impacts its economic stability. Any reduction in water availability can devastate crops, increase rural poverty, and drive further migration. Thus, water-sharing disputes are not just environmental or political issues—they are deeply intertwined with Bangladesh’s economic survival.
Regional Geopolitics and the China Factor
The bilateral tension between Bangladesh and India does not exist in isolation; it is part of a larger regional dynamic where China’s growing influence plays a role. In recent years, China has invested heavily in Bangladesh’s infrastructure and economy, offering an alternative source of support and development financing.
Bangladesh’s growing ties with China, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), have been viewed with suspicion in New Delhi. India fears losing influence over Bangladesh, especially if Bangladesh turns to China for water management support, dam construction expertise, or climate resilience technology.
This triangular dynamic complicates efforts to build trust between Bangladesh and India. Every negotiation on water sharing takes place against the backdrop of these larger geopolitical shifts, adding layers of strategic calculation to what should be a purely bilateral environmental issue.
Attempts at Resolution: Treaties, Dialogues, and Multilateralism
Despite the numerous challenges, there have been efforts to resolve water-sharing disputes through bilateral treaties and dialogues. The 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty was a landmark agreement, demonstrating that compromise is possible. The Joint Rivers Commission, established in 1972, continues to provide a forum for dialogue, even if progress is slow.
However, these efforts have been hampered by political shifts, lack of enforcement mechanisms, and the absence of basin-wide, multilateral approaches. A comprehensive solution would require cooperation not just between Bangladesh and India, but also with other upstream countries like China, Nepal, and Bhutan.
The Way Forward: Trust-Building and Sustainable Management
To break the deadlock, both countries need to shift from a zero-sum mindset to a cooperative, basin-wide approach to water management. This would involve:
- Data Sharing and Transparency: Establishing joint mechanisms for real-time data sharing on river flows, rainfall, and climate impacts.
- Sustainable Infrastructure: Developing cross-border water infrastructure projects that benefit both countries, such as joint flood management systems.
- Community Engagement: Including local communities, particularly farmers and fishermen, in water governance dialogues to ensure that local needs and knowledge shape decision-making.
- Multilateral Cooperation: Expanding dialogues to include China, Nepal, and Bhutan to manage shared river basins holistically.
- Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: Establishing binding arbitration mechanisms to resolve disputes impartially.
Conclusion: Beyond Bilateralism
The main conflict between Bangladesh and India—the management of shared rivers—is much more than a technical dispute over water allocation. It reflects broader tensions related to power asymmetry, economic dependency, environmental vulnerability, and regional geopolitics. Addressing this conflict requires more than bilateral treaties; it demands a paradigm shift towards cooperative, inclusive, and sustainable river basin management. Only by fostering trust, transparency, and shared responsibility can Bangladesh and India transform this conflict into an opportunity for deeper cooperation and regional stability.
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